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The owner of Fair Play Bakery (“Fair Play”) decides he has had 
enough of the pastries and that it is time to sell his whole bakery. 
 
 *  © 2018 Robert T. Lucas IV. 
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Fortunately, We Pastry Inc. (“We Pastry”), a national baking chain, 
feels that the layout and products of Fair Play are unique and worth 
copying, and the national baking chain quickly draws up a stock 
purchase agreement to acquire Fair Play. After both parties execute 
the stock purchase agreement, Fair Play changes its name to We Play 
Fair and continues operating at a considerable, but less-than-
projected, profit. We Pastry, ever mindful of its profit margins, 
decides to claw back some of its purchase price by demanding 
$200,000 out of an escrow account that was set aside to indemnify We 
Pastry if it suffered a loss due to undisclosed weaknesses in Fair Play’s 
business. The terms of the stock purchase agreement contemplate 
that We Pastry assumes the responsibility for We Play Fair’s 
continued success, so a demand on the purchase price is sharp dealing 
but also arguably deceptive and unfair.  
However improper We Pastry’s activity may appear on its face, 
North Carolina’s “unfair or deceptive practices” statute, commonly 
known as section 75-1.1,1 will be unavailable to the baker of Fair Play 
if he tries to sue for the $200,000 he is due under the stock purchase 
agreement. Section 75-1.1 is inapplicable—not because North 
Carolinians would consider We Pastry’s activity fair or would think 
that the baker should pursue litigation under securities laws but 
because courts have held that section 75-1.1 does not apply to 
securities transactions. If We Pastry deceived customers about its 
purportedly gluten-free croissants, it could be liable for treble 
damages and attorneys’ fees,2 but because it unfairly deprived a baker 
of $200,000 under a stock purchase agreement, the statute punishing 
unfairness does not apply. 
This hypothetical touches on a key issue in section 75-1.1 cases: 
At what point does business activity become commerce that affects, 
and potentially injures, consumers? Section 75-1.1 would apply to 
unfair or deceptive acts in Fair Play’s sale of pastries to a customer 
because that conduct is undoubtedly consumer related. Courts and 
lawyers have more difficulty, however, in applying section 75-1.1 to 
situations that do not involve an injury to an everyday customer. 
Much of this difficulty arises when section 75-1.1 collides with 
regulatory structures designed to address fraud or unfairness in 
 
 1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-1.1 (2017); see also Matthew W. Sawchak & Kip D. Nelson, 
Defining Unfairness in “Unfair Trade Practices,” 90 N.C. L. REV. 2033, 2034 n.1 (2012) 
(explaining why the authors “refer to this statute as ‘section 75-1.1’” in their article). 
 2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-16 (2017) (providing for treble damages for successful 
claims); id. §	75-16.1 (authorizing discretionary attorneys’ fees). 
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particular legal contexts, such as securities laws. A claim under such 
regulatory structures also generally does not fall within the scope of 
section 75-1.1 when the regulations adequately address the issue and 
occupy the field. But when a plaintiff cannot otherwise address 
unfairness in their business dealings, section 75-1.1 is intended to 
provide an effective and necessary means of doing so. For more than 
a quarter century, however, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has 
left the law in limbo and undermined its potential as a remedial 
backstop when regulatory schemes do not apply. 
This Comment aims to define the contentious boundary between 
section 75-1.1 jurisprudence and more pervasive regulatory structures 
to demonstrate unworkable gaps in the law, focusing particularly on 
securities transactions. This discussion highlights the potential of 
section 75-1.1 as a tool to address unfairness when regulations fail to 
provide a remedy for a particular type of misconduct. While many 
regulatory agencies and laws are finely tuned to the field they 
regulate, their application cannot extend beyond that field. Section 
75-1.1 provides an opportunity to address misconduct that falls 
between regulatory cracks. The discussion below aims to articulate 
this role of section 75-1.1 as a regulatory backstop, not a regulatory 
alternative, using the case law surrounding securities transactions as a 
template. 
The analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the history of 
section 75-1.1 and illustrates how it became a ubiquitous claim in 
commercial lawsuits in North Carolina. This Part also explains how 
section 75-1.1 claims became particularly problematic for courts in 
North Carolina. Part II addresses the confrontation between section 
75-1.1 and regulatory schemes generally and how the statute has been 
used in, or more commonly held inapplicable to, those interactions. 
Part III explains how the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision 
in HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc.3 greatly broadened 
the securities exemption to section 75-1.1 and details the resulting 
effect on section 75-1.1 as a potent tool in business disputes. Part IV 
discusses an important question raised in the HAJMM dissent and the 
impractical standard set forth in the majority opinion. Finally, Part V 
suggests possible solutions to help tailor section 75-1.1 to the 
boundary of pervasively regulated areas of law rather than dismissing 
claims categorically because a regulatory structure might or might not 
apply. 
 
 3. 328 N.C. 578, 403 S.E.2d 483 (1991). 
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I.  HISTORY OF SECTION 75-1.1 AND “COMMERCE” 
Section 75-1.1 provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce, and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in 
or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”4 Much of the litigation 
surrounding this statute focuses on what precisely constitutes 
“commerce.”5 The statute itself defines “commerce” to “include[] all 
business activities, however denominated,”6 but that definition, 
despite being the product of revision, is still subject to considerable 
ambiguity upon review by the courts.7 
The primary appeal of section 75-1.1 claims from the plaintiff’s 
perspective comes in the statute’s award of treble damages and 
possible attorneys’ fees.8 Plaintiffs regularly include section 75-1.1 
claims because of the potential windfall and the difficulty courts face 
when deciding whether a claim can survive a motion to dismiss. 
This Part offers background on section 75-1.1’s development and 
details how it evolved to include such a broad definition of commerce. 
The discussion then turns to the challenges of applying such a broad 
definition of commerce. 
A. Section 75-1.1’s Increasingly Expansive Scope 
The General Assembly enacted section 75-1.1’s current 
definition of “commerce” after the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
narrowly interpreted the original version of the statute to apply only 
to those acts “involved in the bargain, sale, barter, exchange or 
traffic” of goods.9 That original version of section 75-1.1, enacted in 
1969, provided that “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce 
 
 4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-1.1(a) (2017). 
 5. See, e.g., HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493; State ex rel. Edmisten v. 
J.	C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 315–16, 233 S.E.2d 895, 898–99 (1977), superseded by 
statute, Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, sec. 2, §	75-1.1(b), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984, 984 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-1.1(b) (2017)). 
 6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-1.1(b) (2017). 
 7. The exceptions to section 75-1.1 tend to be the most ambiguous parts of the law. 
For example, the “professional services” exception precludes section 75-1.1 liability for 
“learned profession[s].” Id. Under North Carolina law, “learned profession” is an 
undefined category that has expanded from encompassing only doctors, lawyers, and 
theologians to now include architects and engineers. See RCDI Constr., Inc. v. 
Spaceplan/Architecture, Planning, & Interiors, P.A., 148 F. Supp. 2d 607, 618–19 
(W.D.N.C. 2001). 
 8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-16 (2017) (providing for treble damages for successful 
claims); id. §	75-16.1 (authorizing discretionary attorneys’ fees). 
 9. Edmisten, 292 N.C. at 316–17, 233 S.E.2d at 899. 
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are hereby declared unlawful.”10 Including the word “trade” in the 
statute allowed for narrower judicial interpretation because activity 
unrelated to a trade could be excepted.11 The statute as written did 
not provide a conduct standard for violations, so courts imposed a 
narrow standard by seizing on the “trade practices” language.12 The 
General Assembly amended section 75-1.1 in 1977 to cover “all 
business activities, however denominated,” but the statute still did not 
prescribe a conduct standard.13 
In addition to expansively defining commerce, section 75-1.1 also 
imposes automatic treble damages and discretionary attorneys’ fees 
on the unsuccessful defendant.14 These plaintiff-friendly features have 
rendered section 75-1.1 a “boilerplate claim in most every complaint 
based on a commercial or consumer transaction in North Carolina.”15 
Accordingly, restraining “section 75-1.1 (along with its promise of 
extraordinary damages) within its proper legal bounds” is a crucial 
task for North Carolina’s courts.16 “‘[P]iggyback’ claims are 
disfavored by North Carolina and federal courts alike,”17 leading to 
the logical conclusion that section 75-1.1 should apply only in cases 
where a more suitable remedy cannot be found in contract or other 
applicable law. 
Keeping section 75-1.1’s severe penalties narrowly constrained 
highlights its role as a rare and powerful tool. The regulatory 
 
 10. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, §	1(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930, 930 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-1.1(a) (2017)) (emphasis added).  
 11. Edmisten, 292 N.C. at 316, 233 S.E.2d at 899. 
 12. Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 1, at 2037–38. 
 13. Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, sec. 2, §	75-1.1(b), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984, 984 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-1.1(b) (2017)). 
 14. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-16 (2017) (“If any person shall be injured or the business of 
any person, firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any 
act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of 
this Chapter, such person, firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on 
account of such injury done, and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be 
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by 
the verdict.”); id. §	75-16.1 (“In any suit instituted by a person who alleges that the 
defendant violated [section] 75-1.1, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a 
reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the prevailing party, 
such attorney fee to be taxed as a part of the court costs and payable by the losing party 
.	.	.	.”). 
 15. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Allied Distribs., Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 847 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.N.C. 
1993)). 
 16. Post v. Avita Drugs, LLC, No. 17 CVS 798, 2017 WL 4582151, at *4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. 
Oct. 11, 2017). 
 17. Id. 
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structures that govern many business interactions create difficulty in 
applying section 75-1.1 appropriately without overextending its reach. 
Even in the absence of a mandatory regulatory remedy, a court may 
identify a “pervasive and intricate” regulatory scheme that already 
occupies the field and thus refuse to apply section 75-1.1.18 The 
difficult question for courts and lawyers alike, then, is what to do 
when allegedly unfair or deceptive conduct arises out of a transaction 
related to a regulatory scheme but the conduct itself is not actually 
subject to the scheme’s regulations. 
B. A Consumer Protection Statute That Can Be Applied to Disputes 
Between Businesses 
The purpose of section 75-1.1 and the attending treble damages 
provision in section 75-16 is “to establish an effective private cause of 
action for aggrieved consumers” in North Carolina.19 That private 
cause of action empowers consumers to defend themselves from 
conduct that is not sufficiently covered by existing common law or 
other regulations. Although section 75-1.1 “was clearly intended to 
benefit consumers .	.	. its protections extend to businesses in 
appropriate contexts.”20 Section 75-1.1 claims address even business-
to-business transactions outside the consumer context because “unfair 
trade practices involving only businesses affect the consumer as 
well.”21 However, a “business is permitted to assert [a section 75-1.1] 
claim against another business only when the businesses are 
competitors (or potential competitors) or are engaged in commercial 
dealings with each other.”22 Commerce between businesses ultimately 
affects consumers, so market interactions between businesses fall 
within section 75-1.1’s scope. 23 
Section 75-1.1 claims for unfair or deceptive conduct fall into five 
general categories: 
1) general “unfair” conduct that offends public policy .	.	. [or] is 
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially 
injurious to consumers; 2) “deceptive” misrepresentations that 
 
 18. See, e.g., Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 
(1985) (holding that “securities transactions are beyond the scope of [section] 75-1.1”). 
 19. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981). 
 20. HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 592, 403 S.E.2d 483, 
492 (1991). 
 21. United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988). 
 22. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 520 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 23. Id. at 519–20 (quoting Kuykendall, 322 N.C. at 665, 370 S.E.2d at 389). 
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have the capacity or tendency to deceive the average person; 3) 
per se violations of §	75-1.1 established upon proof of a 
statutory or regulatory violation or the commission of certain 
torts; 4) a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating 
circumstances; and 5) anti-competitive	conduct.24 
The discussion in Part II focuses on the first and second 
categories, which cover unfair conduct and deceptive 
misrepresentations. These categories allow considerable flexibility 
and ideally contribute to section 75-1.1’s effectiveness as a tool for 
courts to punish and remedy bad action in the business community. 
The general unfairness category appears to give the statute broad 
license to combat unscrupulous business activity and should justify 
section 75-1.1 as a de facto regulatory tool when other regulatory 
schemes do not provide a remedy.  
Section 75-1.1’s potential as a highly effective tool in disputes 
between businesses, however, is hampered by overbroad or loosely 
defined exemptions. One such exemption is the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina’s categorical position that “securities transactions are 
beyond the scope of [section] 75-1.1.”25 While this securities 
exemption doctrine was founded on the strong principle that section 
75-1.1 should not be used to add unnecessary complexity to already 
complex areas of law, like securities regulation, its ultimate effect 
illustrates the difficulty of drawing the line between useful section 75-
1.1 protection and a pervasive regulatory scheme. 
II.  APPLYING SECTION 75-1.1 WHEN REGULATIONS OCCUPY THE 
FIELD 
Though the North Carolina General Assembly intended for 
section 75-1.1’s scope to be broad,26 courts have limited the statute’s 
scope when other regulations occupy the field. This Part examines 
section 75-1.1’s interaction with, and often its inapplicability to, an 
area of law that is already subject to sprawling regulatory structures. 
First, this Part introduces the foundational reasoning of the securities 
exemption to show how formal regulations can deal with disputes 
 
 24. Sparks v. Oxy-Health, LLC, 134 F. Supp. 3d 961, 997–98 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 1, at 2042–50 (discussing each 
type of section 75-1.1 claim). 
 25. Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1985) 
(adopting the securities exemption of the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Lindner v. Durham 
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 26. See supra Section I.A.  
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more effectively than section 75-1.1. Second, the discussion turns to 
the interesting development that private regulations are sufficient to 
resolve disputes effectively and allow courts to further narrow section 
75-1.1’s applicability by providing parties another avenue to air their 
grievances. 
A. Containing Section 75-1.1’s Scope When Formal Regulatory 
Structures Apply 
The original securities exemption to section 75-1.1 provided 
courts with a proper and useful reason to dismiss a claim—the 
transaction at issue clearly fell within the exclusive scope of securities 
laws. Section 75-1.1’s applicability to securities transactions was an 
issue of first impression as late as 1985, when Lindner v. Durham 
Hosiery Mills, Inc.27 led the Fourth Circuit to “ascertain what the 
North Carolina Supreme Court would decide” if determining the 
scope of section 75-1.1.28 Referring to the federal law that provided 
the framework for section 75-1.1,29 the Lindner court relied on “the 
fact that no federal court decision [had] applied §	5(a)(1) of the 
[Federal Trade Commission] Act to securities transactions [as] 
additional evidence of the scope of §	75-1.1.”30 The Lindner court 
ultimately concluded that “securities transactions are beyond the 
reach of [section 75-1.1].”31  
In Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,32 The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina adopted the Lindner securities exemption with its decision.33 
Looking to other jurisdictions in support of its decision, the Skinner 
court noted that its “research reveal[ed] no case in which a state court 
has held that its unfair trade practices act extends to securities 
transactions.”34 Importantly, the Skinner court reasoned that 
securities transactions are “already subject to pervasive and intricate 
regulation under the North Carolina Securities Act”; therefore, 
applying section 75-1.1’s protections to securities “could subject those 
 
 27. 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 28. Id. at 165. 
 29. See 15 U.S.C. §	45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby 
declared unlawful.”). 
 30. Lindner, 761 F.2d at 167. 
 31. Id. at 168. 
 32. 314 N.C. 267, 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985). 
 33. Id. at 275, 333 S.E.2d at 241 (holding that “securities transactions are beyond the 
scope of [section] 75-1.1”). 
 34. Id. at 274, 333 S.E.2d at 241. 
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involved with securities transactions to overlapping supervision and 
enforcement.”35 
Securities laws are finely tuned to address subtle instances of 
unfairness and deception related to the exchange of securities within 
the scope of regulation.36 The effectiveness of securities laws within 
their arena should not be confused with the potential or need for 
robust legal frameworks to address misconduct in business dealings 
that do not fall within the defined area of securities regulation. 
Fortunately, securities laws govern only one of many pervasively 
regulated areas of law.37 
 
 35. Id. at 275, 333 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting Lindner, 761 F.2d at 167–68). Securities 
supervision and enforcement sufficiently provided by securities laws may assist with 
illustrating section 75-1.1’s applicability or inapplicability. See Opper v. Hancock Secs. 
Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), abrogated by Asch v. Philips, Appel & Walden, 
Inc., 867 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1989). Opper demonstrates how to address deceptive 
misrepresentations in a securities transaction entirely through federal securities laws. See 
id. at 673. The case also shows that federal securities laws tend to provide the most 
effective remedy in a conventional securities setting. Id. Applying basic principles of 
agency law, securities laws, and SEC regulations, the Opper court found a “garden variety 
instance of deception, nondisclosure, and self-preferment by a broker purporting to act as 
a selling agent.” Id. The broker-defendant in Opper misrepresented its efforts to sell 
securities on behalf of the plaintiff while continuing to sell thousands of its own shares in 
the same company for considerable profit at prices it fraudulently told the plaintiff were 
not available. Id. Having noted a violation of fiduciary principles in agency law, the court 
also applied provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. Id.; 
see also 17 C.F.R. §	240.10b-5 (2018). Analyzing case law, the Opper court endorsed the 
“settled” precedent that Congress meant to address “the particularized problems of 
‘manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent’ practices in the securities markets .	.	. 
mean[ing] to reach frauds that ‘may take on more subtle and involved forms than those in 
which dishonesty manifests itself in cruder and less specialized activities.’” Opper, 250 F. 
Supp. at 673 (quoting Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 798 n.5, 803 (8th Cir. 1943)).  
 36. Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943). 
 37. Courts continue to identify fields that properly resolve disputes and render section 
75-1.1 redundant and inapplicable. See, e.g., Hagy v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., No. 3:15-
CV-509-RJC-DCK, 2016 WL 5661530, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2016) (explaining that 
while a plaintiff’s section 75-1.1 claim is not essentially preempted by the Medicare 
scheme, the scope of section 75-1.1 does not cover an issue already pervasively regulated); 
Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 38 N.C. App. 414, 420–21, 248 S.E.2d 567, 570 
(1978) (declining to extend section 75-1.1 to commodities exchanges, an area Congress 
aimed to regulate thoroughly and exclusively). Some cases show that state regulatory 
schemes are equally as effective at occupying the field as federal schemes. See, e.g., Tobias 
v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 1:17CV486, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48, at *11 (M.D.N.C. 
Jan. 2, 2018) (“Article 2 of Chapter 75 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, entitled 
‘Prohibited Acts by Debt Collectors’, is the exclusive remedy under North Carolina law 
for unfair debt collection practices.”); State ex rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 
184 N.C. App. 613, 624, 646 S.E.2d 790, 798 (2007) (declining to apply section 75-1.1 when 
a North Carolina law directing tobacco producers to deposit money into an escrow fund 
“provides an extensive remedy for failure to comply with the escrow obligation” (citing 
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina has provided some 
guidance on the effect of regulations that, when violated, do not 
automatically trigger section 75-1.1 protection. The effect of a 
regulatory violation on a section 75-1.1 claim, however, remains 
unclear. When deciding if a licensing violation could constitute a 
section 75-1.1 claim, the court has “decline[d] to hold that a violation 
of a licensing regulation is a [section 75-1.1 violation] as a matter of 
law.”38 Failure to comply with licensing rules could, however, 
evidence a section 75-1.1 violation.39 This distinction presumably 
means that section 75-1.1 could be useful as a force multiplier for 
minor regulatory violations, but the court declined to state which 
regulations could support a section 75-1.1 claim and which regulations 
sufficiently remedy a violation without applying the statute.40  
Thus, regulatory violations that themselves cannot give rise to a 
section 75-1.1 claim may nevertheless constitute evidence to support 
the claim. However, more direct judicial discussion is necessary 
regarding section 75-1.1’s value as a punitive tool to add force in 
addressing minor violations rather than including the statute as a 
burdensome addition to more pervasive regulatory schemes. It is 
possible that the “violation of a regulatory statute designed to protect 
the consuming public may constitute an unfair or deceptive practice, 
even where the statute itself does not provide for a private right of 
action.”41 However, this is true “only where the regulatory statute 
specifically defines and proscribes conduct which is unfair or 
deceptive within” the scope of section 75-1.1.42 
B. Private Dispute Resolution Structures 
Defining the boundary between a regulatory scheme that could 
substantiate a section 75-1.1 claim and a scheme that may preempt a 
section 75-1.1 claim ultimately determines whether the claim can 
survive as a matter of law. The previous section focused on statutory 
 
HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 593, 403 S.E.2d 483, 493 
(1991))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 362 N.C. 431, 666 S.E.2d 107 (2008). 
 38. Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 71, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 
(2007). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99; Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 1, at 2045 
n.55 (“The court .	.	. said little about why licensing regulations are less appropriate triggers 
for per se section 75-1.1 violations than other types of regulations are.”). 
 41. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d 
448, 454 (2009) (citing Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 723, 454 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1995)). 
 42. Id. 
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or agency-generated regulatory structures. But the inapplicability of 
section 75-1.1 to some regulatory schemes is not limited to just public 
regulatory schemes. As a recent Fourth Circuit case illustrates, 
section 75-1.1 may also be preempted by private codes of conduct.43 
In Champion Pro Consulting Group, Inc. v. Impact Sports 
Football, LLC,44 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a section 
75-1.1 claim related to Robert Quinn, a former football star at the 
University of North Carolina, and his decision to switch agents.45 
Although the Champion Pro court admitted that the pervasive and 
intricate regulation in place, the National Football League Players 
Association’s (“NFLPA”) dispute resolution system, was “not a 
statutory scheme,” the court nevertheless applied a preemption 
reasoning similar to that in Skinner based on the fact that “the 
NFLPA has created an extensive regulatory regime to govern 
business activities within the industry.”46 The Champion Pro court 
was satisfied that the NFLPA system “provided a remedy for 
violations in the form of monetary damages and a means to obtain 
that remedy through arbitration.”47 The court also noted that the 
NFLPA views itself as a regulatory body over industry issues relating 
to NFL players and their representatives, and applying section 75-1.1 
in that regulatory context would impose overlapping regulations like 
those rejected by Skinner.48 
Champion Pro illustrates that the availability of a remedy under 
a pervasive and intricate scheme clearly plays a central role in 
dismissing a section 75-1.1 claim. A plaintiff with an available or more 
suitable means of recovery through existing regulatory structures, 
even if those structures are private codes of conduct, will face a high 
bar to sustain a section 75-1.1 claim.49 Dismissal as a matter of law 
may await cases that implicate extensively regulated issues as judges 
 
 43. Champion Pro Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Impact Sports Football, LLC, 845 F.3d 104, 
110 (4th Cir. 2016) (dismissing a section 75-1.1 claim based on allegations “already subject 
to an extensive regulatory regime under the NFLPA”). 
 44. 845 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 45. Id. at 112; see also Stephen Feldman, Can Extensive Regulations Bar a Claim for 
Unfair Trade Practices?, ELLIS & WINTERS: WHAT’S FAIR? (Feb. 14, 2017), 
http://www.unfairtradepracticesnc.com/can-extensive-regulatory-regime-bar-claim-unfair-trade-
practices/ [https://perma.cc/7MCF-7EJV]. 
 46. Champion Pro, 845 F.3d at 111. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Feldman, supra note 45. 
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defer to the expedience of a system particularly designed to resolve 
the matter.  
A question remains, however, as to what happens to section 75-
1.1 claims that relate to a pervasive and intricate body of law but 
nonetheless fall outside its protections. Unfortunately, the current 
answer in North Carolina is that section 75-1.1 also fails to cover 
those claims as a matter of law. 
III.  EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS OUTSIDE OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES: 
HAJMM’S EXPANSION OF SECTION 75-1.1’S SECURITIES EXEMPTION 
The reasoning that drove the Skinner court to exempt securities 
transactions from North Carolina’s section 75-1.1 protection creates a 
reasonable scope for the exemption—securities laws are designed to 
serve as the primary method of recovery and boundary of liability for 
securities-related transactions. Similarly, the Champion Pro plaintiff 
could find a satisfactory and perhaps more effective resolution 
through the applicable NFLPA channels.50 It is reasonable to expect 
that specifically tailored regulatory schemes can dispose of particular 
disputes better than section 75-1.1. Imposing liability under section 
75-1.1 would seem possible, though, when the regulatory scheme in 
question clearly has no capacity to regulate unfairness or deception 
that arises in a transaction. Cases involving modern securities 
transactions, which are no longer subject to the same reasoning 
applied in Skinner, show that courts still decline to apply section 75-
1.1 protections despite the unavailability of a remedy by other means. 
This Part identifies gaps in section 75-1.1 jurisprudence since 
HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. was decided in the 
early 1990s. The discussion first explains the facts of HAJMM and 
analyzes the decision’s precedent-setting diversion from Skinner. 
Next, it explores the true impact of the decision, highlighting how it 
broadened the securities exemption and overly narrowed section 75-
1.1’s applicability. 
A. HAJMM’s Unusual Facts and the Broadening of Section 75-1.1’s 
Securities Exemption 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in HAJMM 
reinterpreted the securities exemption six years after Skinner. In 
HAJMM, a case involving unregulated revolving fund certificates 
 
 50. See Champion Pro, 845 F.3d at 111. 
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instead of “conventional corporate securities,”51 the court held “that 
the legislature simply did not intend for the trade, issuance and 
redemption of corporate securities or similar financial instruments to 
be transactions ‘in or affecting commerce’ as those terms are used in 
N.C.G.S. §	75-1.1(a).”52 The court then narrowly defined “business 
activities,” holding the term to mean “the manner in which businesses 
conduct their regular, day-to-day activities, or affairs, such as the 
purchase and sale of goods, or whatever other activities the business 
regularly engages in and for which it is organized.”53 
The defendant in HAJMM, House of Raeford Farms, Inc. 
(“Raeford”), was a “North Carolina agricultural cooperative engaged 
in the business of processing turkeys and other poultry.”54 Raeford 
raised money when the plaintiff and two other turkey producers sold 
their interests in Raeford Turkey Farms, Inc. (“RTF”) in exchange 
for “revolving fund certificates issued by Raeford. The certificates 
became part of Raeford’s capital structure and [were] shown as 
stockholder’s equity on Raeford’s balance sheet.”55 The Raeford 
certificates valued the plaintiff’s RTF interests at $387,500 and noted 
that the certificates would be retired at the sole discretion of 
Raeford’s board with no date of maturity.56 The certificates were 
meant to create “a revolving fund for the purpose of building up such 
an amount of capital as may be deemed necessary by the board of 
directors from time to time and for revolving such capital.”57 
Raeford redeemed the certificates given to the other turkey 
producers but refused to retire the plaintiff’s certificate.58 A key piece 
of the plaintiff’s argument in support of its section 75-1.1 claim was 
that Raeford never intended to retire the certificate or pay it despite 
having sufficient cash on hand to cover the $387,500 sum.59 The jury 
concluded that Raeford’s refusal to retire the certificate was not “an 
open, fair and honest transaction” and awarded the plaintiff $100,000 
 
 51. HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 594, 403 S.E.2d 483, 
493 (1991). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 580, 403 S.E.2d at 485. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 581, 403 S.E.2d at 485–86. 
 57. Id. at 581, 403 S.E.2d at 486. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 581–82, 403 S.E.2d at 486. 
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in punitive damages in addition to $387,500 in compensatory 
damages.60 
On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
applied the securities exemption despite admitting that the revolving 
fund certificates at issue were “not subject to the same extensive 
statutory provisions and administrative regulation that govern more 
conventional corporate securities.”61 Without citing a case or other 
authority, the HAJMM majority defined “business activities” for 
section 75-1.1 purposes to include only “activities the business 
regularly engages in and for which it is organized.”62 Accordingly, the 
securities exemption as originally stated in Skinner did not provide 
the main basis for dismissing the section 75-1.1 claim in HAJMM, 
thereby adding an entirely new aspect to the securities exemption 
doctrine. 
Following HAJMM, the securities exemption precludes claims 
based on events that fall outside the business’s day-to-day activities, 
even if those less common activities are vital to running the business.63 
Transactions relating in any meaningful way to securities are 
therefore not business activities within the scope of section 75-1.1, 
and unfair or deceptive practices conducted with regard to those 
securities or other extraordinary events in the life of the business do 
not form a cause of action under the statute.64 This unfortunate 
limitation on the statute highlights section 75-1.1’s role in providing a 
potential remedy when no other avenue is open to a plaintiff and 
undermines the Skinner analysis of pervasive and intricate regulatory 
schemes that previously formed the heart of the securities exemption 
doctrine. 
B. “Extraordinary Events” as a New Basis for Dismissing Section 75-
1.1 Claims 
The HAJMM majority reasoned that “[t]he issuance of securities 
is an extraordinary event done for the purpose of raising capital in 
order that the enterprise can either be organized for the purpose of 
conducting its business activities or, if already a going concern, to 
enable it to continue its business activities.”65 Interpreting this 
 
 60. Id. at 582–83, 403 S.E.2d at 486–87. 
 61. Id. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 594–95, 403 S.E.2d at 493. 
 65. Id. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493. 
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reasoning requires further note that “the securities exception is not 
limited to the purchase and sale of securities—‘[s]ecurities 
transactions are related to the creation, transfer, or retirement of 
capital.’”66 The HAJMM transmutation of Skinner’s securities 
exemption thus covers the entire life cycle of any capital-raising 
transaction, whether or not the transaction can be regulated by 
traditional securities laws. 
The problem with this reasoning, as now-Chief Justice Mark 
Martin correctly noted in his dissent, is that conducting a business 
necessarily involves capital-raising efforts and transactions.67 
Moreover, the HAJMM majority “cite[d] no authority, and our 
statute and cases provide[d] none, to support its argument that 
‘commerce’ means only the ‘regular, day-to-day activities or affairs’ of 
a business.”68 This was true even as the majority reasoned that the 
revolving fund certificates served the “same function served by 
issuing more conventional corporate securities,” and the court’s 
“conclusion in Skinner that [section 75-1.1] does not apply to 
corporate securities should also extend to revolving fund certificates 
unless there is good reason to treat the certificates differently.”69 
Accepting the argument that the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has a responsibility to hand down precedent-making 
decisions, the HAJMM flaw creates problems because the decision is 
more akin to legislation on the scope of section 75-1.1 rather than 
judicial guidance. The HAJMM court could not logically apply the 
Skinner exemption because revolving certificates are unregulated 
forms of securities, but the majority apparently felt the need to 
restrain the statute’s use and create new grounds for dismissing 
tenuous claims. However valid that goal may have been, the HAJMM 
rule now provides a sweeping basis to dismiss claims whenever unfair 
or deceptive conduct occurs outside the most core functions of the 
business. The problem is that doing business involves much more than 
conducting day-to-day operations, and HAJMM makes section 75-1.1 
unavailable in those less common business events. 
The fatal error in HAJMM came in the majority’s failure to 
recognize that “revolving fund certificates are not subject to the same 
 
 66. Sloan v. Inolife Techs., Inc., No. 17 CVS 306, 2017 WL 2268401, at *9 (N.C. Bus. 
Ct. May 22, 2017) (quoting HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493). 
 67. See HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 596, 403 S.E.2d at 494 (Martin, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 593, 403 S.E.2d at 493 (majority opinion). 
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extensive statutory provisions and administrative regulation that 
govern more conventional corporate securities” and that 
differentiating between the certificates and conventional securities 
was thus justifiable.70 Cases disposing of section 75-1.1 claims in the 
pervasive regulation context justifiably do so when that regulatory 
scheme provides a remedial alternative.71 The HAJMM certificates, 
by contrast, confronted an admittedly “incidental” and “largely 
advisory rather than mandatory” level of involvement from any 
regulatory agency.72 The majority continued on its “extraordinary 
event” line of reasoning without precedential support, holding that 
[s]ecurities transactions are related to the creation, transfer, or 
retirement of capital. Unlike regular purchase and sale of 
goods, or whatever else the enterprise was organized to do, they 
are not “business activities” as that term is used in [section 75-
1.1]. They are not, therefore, “in or affecting commerce,” even 
under a reasonably broad interpretation of the legislative intent 
underlying these terms.73 
The HAJMM court did not elaborate on or analyze that 
legislative intent, and the decision left subsequent courts to speculate 
what a “broad interpretation” of that intent may entail.74 The 
majority’s conclusory language would have to suffice for precedential 
value, explaining flatly that “[r]evolving fund certificates are a 
cooperative’s functional equivalent of traditional corporate securities. 
They are capital-raising devices. We conclude, therefore, that, like 
more conventional securities, issuance or redemption of revolving 
fund certificates are not ‘in or affecting commerce’ and are not 
subject to [section 75-1.1].”75 Unlike more conventional securities, of 
course, the certificates and those misusing them are subject to no 
regulatory scheme or its accompanying protections or punishments, 
leaving a gap in the legal coverage that section 75-1.1 could fill. 
IV.  THE HAJMM DISSENT  
Justice Martin dissented from the HAJMM conclusion that a 
section 75-1.1 claim involving capital-raising activity could not survive 
 
 70. Id. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493. 
 71. See, e.g., Champion Pro Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Impact Sports Football, LLC, 845 
F.3d 104, 111 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 72. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at 595, 403 S.E.2d at 493. 
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as a matter of law. In his dissent, Justice Martin questioned “[h]ow .	.	. 
raising funds to operate a business” could not be considered a 
“business activity.”76 This Part discusses why that question is vital to 
section 75-1.1 jurisprudence moving forward and how HAJMM as 
precedent makes the question only more important to ask. After 
highlighting the practical realities Justice Martin raised in his dissent, 
this Part uses cases relying on HAJMM to illustrate its unworkable 
standard. 
A. Justice Martin’s Predictions in HAJMM 
The restrictive effect of the majority’s reasoning became clear in 
later cases,77 but Justice Martin forecasted the transformational effect 
the holding would have on the Skinner securities exemption and its 
broader reasoning regarding pervasive regulation. As he noted in 
dissent: 
The majority relies heavily upon cases involving securities 
transactions. However, these cases are inapposite, because they 
were decided upon the theory that securities transactions were 
already subject to extensive regulation under state and federal 
law, and the application of [section] 75-1.1 would subject such 
transactions to overlapping supervision and enforcement.78 
Justice Martin aptly criticized “the startling argument” that the 
issuance of unregulated certificates intended to raise capital for a 
business is “not a ‘business activity’ within the meaning of the 
statute.”79 
Justice Martin argued that businesses cannot function in a 
modern economy without raising capital.80 Additionally, not all 
businesses have the resources, sophistication, or will to issue 
traditional securities that allow investors to rely on the regulatory 
structure surrounding sophisticated securities. Eliminating section 75-
1.1 protections in the absence of a regulatory remedy “loses touch 
 
 76. Id. at 596, 403 S.E.2d at 494 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 77. See, e.g., Latigo Invs. II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc., No. 06 CVS 18666, 
2007 WL 2570753, at *5 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 22, 2007) (requiring a North Carolina Business 
Court judge to dismiss a section 75-1.1 claim because the claim related to unfairness in the 
context of a capital-raising transaction). 
 78. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 596, 403 S.E.2d at 494 (Martin, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (“The acquisition of capital in one form or another is the lifeblood today for 
business.”). 
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with the reality of the business world,” where businesspeople need 
investors and investors need remedies.81 The HAJMM majority 
created a dangerous loophole in section 75-1.1; a restrictive definition 
of business activities as “the day-to-day affairs of the business 
eliminates most of the raising of business capital from the protection 
of the statute. The most important area of business life is no longer 
subject to [section 75-1.1], but the sales of a baker, for example, 
remain.”82  
Section 75-1.1, by its text, applies to “all business activities, 
however denominated.”83 How then could a baker be liable under 
section 75-1.1 for unscrupulous sales of baked goods but not 
deception related to raising money to run his business? Justice Martin 
correctly asserted in HAJMM that “[n]o matter how one twists it, the 
issuance of the certificate and defendant’s refusal to redeem it were 
business activities within the meaning of [section 75-1.1].”84 As Justice 
Martin emphasized, HAJMM’s effect in expanding the Skinner 
exemption at best muddies the boundary between section 75-1.1 and 
pervasively regulated areas of law. At worst, the decision leaves 
investors holding nontraditional securities, like revolving fund 
certificates, vulnerable by giving them no protection under section 75-
1.1 and allowing unscrupulous businesspeople to evade a statute that 
could effectively deter unfair and deceptive dealing. 
B. HAJMM’s Rule Makes “Extraordinary Events” Out of Most 
Regular Business Activities Related to Securities 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina subsequently described 
HAJMM as a simple case of statutory interpretation, noting “that our 
General Assembly demonstrated with the text of [section 75-1.1] that 
it intended [section 75-1.1] to regulate a business’s regular 
interactions with other market participants.”85 If HAJMM’s effect had 
remained so limited in its scope, that characterization would have 
been helpful in differentiating cases where section 75-1.1 should apply 
to complement existing regulatory structures and those where the 
regulation sufficiently occupies the field. However, the HAJMM 
restriction of section 75-1.1 to “activities the business regularly 
 
 81. Id. at 596, 403 S.E.2d at 495. 
 82. Id. at 596–97, 403 S.E.2d at 495. 
 83. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-1.1(b) (2017). 
 84. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 597, 403 S.E.2d at 495 (Martin, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 85. White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 51, 691 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2010). 
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engages in”86 created an entire body of case law that categorically 
applies the securities exemption to dismiss section 75-1.1 claims 
related to capital-raising or securities transactions, regardless of 
whether any other regulatory remedy or oversight applies.87  
Unfortunately, the malleability of HAJMM’s definition of 
“business activity” has also led North Carolina courts to expand the 
reach of the capital-raising exemption. Take, for example, Oberlin 
Capital, L.P. v. Slavin.88 In that case, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a section 75-1.1 claim relating to 
alleged misrepresentations made to acquire a loan simply because the 
loan had a capital-raising aspect.89 Though not all courts have viewed 
HAJMM favorably, the decision remains good law and generally 
leaves lower courts with their hands tied, requiring them to dismiss or 
affirm dismissals of otherwise viable claims. 
Prior to his appointment to the Fourth Circuit, Judge Albert 
Diaz issued an important decision on the HAJMM formulation of the 
securities exemption while serving on the North Carolina Business 
Court. In Latigo Investments II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Financial, 
Inc.,90 Judge Diaz found the plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish 
HAJMM and Oberlin “unavailing” because a “[c]ourt’s proper focus 
under the relevant cases is not ‘who is a party to the transaction,’ but 
rather ‘what is the purpose of the transaction.’”91 North Carolina 
Business Court judges decide many motions to dismiss section 75-1.1 
claims under the HAJMM standard, and the dispositive issue for their 
analysis under HAJMM is simply “whether the transactions at issue 
involved securities or other financial instruments involved in raising 
capital.”92 
 
 86. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493. 
 87. See, e.g., Oberlin Capital, L.P. v. Slavin, 147 N.C. App. 52, 62, 554 S.E.2d 840, 848 
(2001) (relying on HAJMM to find that the trial court properly dismissed the claim for 
unfair and deceptive trade practices “[b]ecause the loan agreement at issue here, which 
also granted Oberlin the right to purchase stock in [the debtor corporation] in the future, 
was primarily a capital-raising device [and] it was not ‘in or affecting commerce’”). 
 88. 147 N.C. App. 52, 554 S.E.2d 840 (2001). 
 89. Id. at 62, 554 S.E.2d at 848; see also Latigo Invs. II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Fin., 
Inc., No. 06 CVS 18666, 2007 WL 2570753, at *4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 22, 2007) (explaining 
that “[i]n Oberlin, our Court of Appeals expanded the reach of the [section 75-1.1] 
securities exception”). 
 90. No. 06 CVS 18666, 2007 WL 2570753 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 22, 2007). 
 91. Id. at *4. 
 92. Id. at *5 (quoting White v. Consol. Planning, Inc., 166 N.C. App. 283, 304, 603 
S.E.2d 147, 161 (2004)). 
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Judge Diaz, in a moment of judicial candor, said in his Latigo 
opinion that “[w]ere I writing on a clean slate, I would not dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ [section 75-1.1] claim as, like Justice Martin, I find no 
logical basis for excluding misrepresentations made in the context of 
capital raising transactions from the reach of what is intended to be a 
broad remedial statute.”93 Summarizing his Latigo holding, however, 
Judge Diaz explained that “because the undisputed purpose of the 
transaction in this case .	.	. was to raise capital .	.	. it is not a 
transaction ‘in or affecting commerce’ as that element has been 
defined by the cases,” and he dismissed the section 75-1.1 claim 
accordingly.94 Judge Diaz’s commentary indicates the unworkable and 
overly broad standard Business Court judges are bound to apply 
when deciding a section 75-1.1 claim under the HAJMM precedent. 
Even in cases where the ordinary business activities of a 
company involve the sale of securities, a section 75-1.1 claim cannot 
survive dismissal based on HAJMM and its progeny. In DeGorter v. 
Capitol Bancorp Ltd.,95 for example, the “Plaintiff allege[d] 
Defendants’ conduct regarding the role of the trust preferred 
securities offering in the .	.	. transaction constituted unfair or 
deceptive trade practices under .	.	. section 75-1.1.”96 The DeGorter 
claim was based on evidence that the defendant “deceived [the 
plaintiff] into purchasing the .	.	. securities by misrepresenting or 
failing to timely disclose pertinent information about the financial 
position of [the defendant].”97 The DeGorter court, like Judge Diaz in 
Latigo, was bound to dismiss the section 75-1.1 claim because 
“whether Plaintiff was unfairly induced to purchase the trust 
preferred securities as part of a larger misrepresentation .	.	. [was] 
irrelevant. The only relevant question [was] whether securities were 
involved in the transaction. The issue at hand [was] plainly securities-
related.”98 Dismissing a section 75-1.1 claim when no other regulatory 
structure covers unfairness demonstrates that the HAJMM 
formulation of the securities exemption has proven unworkable and 
contrary to the purpose of a statute that plainly outlaws “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”99 
 
 93. Id. at *4. 
 94. Id. at *5. 
 95. No. 11 CVS 20825, 2011 WL 3300304 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 29, 2011). 
 96. Id. at *3. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at *6. 
 99. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	75-1.1(a) (2017). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2018) 
2018] HAJMM LEGACY 183 
Perhaps the most recent example of the HAJMM conundrum is 
Tillery Environmental LLC v. A&D Holdings, Inc.,100 another 
Business Court case that arose after the conclusion of a merger and 
concerned the final disbursement of the purchase price. The Tillery 
dispute was within the scope of the HAJMM securities exemption 
because the merger between the plaintiff and defendant companies 
admittedly constituted an extraordinary event for those companies. 
A&D Holdings, Inc. (“A&D”) and JBC Acquisition, Inc. (“JBC”) 
merged as a result of a stock purchase agreement.101 Thereafter, the 
allegedly unfair act arose during “a dispute over funds held in 
escrow.”102 The businesses’ day-to-day operations involved industrial 
cleaning, so a merger undoubtedly qualified as an unusual event in 
the life of the business.103 The stock purchase agreement executed a 
transaction involving securities and formed the foundation of the 
dispute.104 The escrow fund left over as the last of the purchase price 
to be disbursed, however, sustained an ongoing business interaction 
between the parties even after the transaction closed because 
“eighteen months after the stock purchase closed and four days 
before the Escrow Funds were to be distributed to Tillery, A&D (as 
JBC’s successor entity) made an indemnification demand to 
Tillery.”105 
Tillery, bringing the section 75-1.1 claim over the indemnity 
demand, alleged that A&D’s demand amounted to an adjustment of 
the purchase price negotiated in the merger because the postmerger 
business was performing poorly.106 As a result of the indemnity 
demand, however, “[t]he Escrow Agent continue[d] to hold the 
Escrow Funds .	.	. until it receive[d] either a court order or joint 
release instructions agreed to by the parties.”107 The demand was 
therefore successful in blocking the final execution of the agreement 
regardless of its merit. 
Noting the difficulty of placing Tillery’s claim in the landscape of 
post-HAJMM case law, Judge Bledsoe wrote that 
 
 100. No. 17 CVS 6525, 2017 WL 3335764 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Aug. 4, 2017). 
 101. Id. at *1. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. at *2. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
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[u]nder Skinner alone, Plaintiff’s [section 75-1.1] claim would 
likely survive. Plaintiff’s allegations focus on Defendants’ 
alleged post-closing attempts to lay claim to the Escrow Funds 
through improper indemnification demands a year and a half 
after the stock purchase closed. Although this action arose out 
of the sale of securities, Plaintiff’s allegations of post-closing 
misconduct under the Escrow Agreement do not appear to 
involve conduct “already subject to pervasive and intricate 
regulation.”108 
HAJMM, however, bound Judge Bledsoe to dismiss Tillery’s 
section 75-1.1 claim under the securities exemption. As he explained, 
“[a]lthough Defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct occurred nearly 
eighteen months after the securities transaction closed, Defendants’ 
conduct is inextricably tied to the sale of securities and the Stock 
Purchase Agreement.”109 Additional application of HAJMM showed 
that the conduct complained of was not an ordinary business event, as 
Defendants’ alleged actions—making improper indemnification 
demands under a specific Stock Purchase Agreement and 
Escrow Agreement—are not indicative of a business’s regular, 
day-to-day activities or affairs. Indeed, the indemnification 
demands made here can only occur once between these parties; 
after the Escrow Agent has made a final distribution of the 
Escrow Funds, the parties will have no further ongoing 
relationship.110 
Judge Bledsoe explained that the court could not sustain a 
section 75-1.1 claim when “the facts alleged in the Complaint .	.	. do 
not describe the parties’ regular, day-to-day business activities. Thus, 
under HAJMM, Plaintiff has failed to allege conduct ‘in or affecting 
commerce’ under section 75-1.1, requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s 
[section 75-1.1] claim.”111 
Tillery demonstrates HAJMM’s overreach in the securities 
context. The allegedly unfair and deceptive conduct—the defendant’s 
taking approximately $2.7 million hostage—could not be judged 
under the statute based only on the fact that the stock purchase 
agreement represented a securities sale. Judge Bledsoe noted that the 
“conduct [was] inextricably tied to the sale of securities,” but 
 
 108. Id. at *5 (quoting Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 
241 (1985)). 
 109. Id. at *6. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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HAJMM nevertheless equates conduct tied to securities with conduct 
potentially remedied under securities laws.112 The Tillery decision 
explicitly notes that such a remedy was not available because the 
pervasive regulatory scheme that justified Skinner was not available 
to the plaintiff in Tillery.113 On one hand, the HAJMM rule simplifies 
the calculus for lower courts by allowing them to grant motions to 
dismiss whenever a securities-related transaction is at issue. On the 
other hand, the rule nullifies the usefulness of section 75-1.1 as a 
regulatory gap-filler because any potential remedy through the 
securities regulation apparatus becomes inapplicable. All that matters 
is whether a security changes hands or capital is raised, not whether 
an allegedly injured plaintiff can seek redress. 
C. The Rare Exceptions to HAJMM’s Rule 
The absence of regulatory liability in securities-related cases has 
allowed some courts to deny motions to dismiss section 75-1.1 claims, 
though these instances appear to represent factually distinguishable 
exceptions to HAJMM rather than the rule. In Hand v. Ace Hardware 
Corp.,114 for instance, the plaintiffs bought small amounts of stock in a 
franchise through a franchise agreement.115 The plaintiffs later sued 
the franchisor, including a section 75-1.1 claim.116 The court denied a 
motion to dismiss the claim under the securities exemption because 
Plaintiffs have not alleged that they were injured as a result of 
the stock purchase, and none of the remedies sought concern 
the stock. Additionally, the justifications for excluding 
securities transactions from the scope of §	75-1.1 do not apply in 
this case. Defendant’s actions would not subject it to liability 
under any of the federal or state securities law. Also, the 
relationship between [Defendant] and the [Plaintiffs] more 
closely resembles an ordinary business transaction than the 
issuance of stock to raise capital. In this case, the stock sale was 
ancillary to the main purpose of the transaction, the [Plaintiffs] 
opening an Ace store in Salisbury. The remainder of the 
transaction is subject to the requirements of the unfair and 
deceptive trade practices statute.117 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at *5. 
 114. No. 4:92CV00454, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10818 (M.D.N.C. July 7, 1995). 
 115. Id. at *18. 
 116. See id. at *13. 
 117. Id. at *19. 
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In Katen v. Katen,118 the defendants bought the plaintiff out of 
the family company through a series of agreements over a ten-year 
period.119 The plaintiff later brought a slew of claims, including one 
under section 75-1.1.120 The court held that the securities exemption 
did not bar the plaintiff’s section 75-1.1 claim because the sale of 
stock was “but one of this series of agreements alleged to have been 
reached between the parties from 1981 to 1991. Plaintiff’s entire claim 
[did] not rise or fall upon that one transaction.”121 This decision 
suggests that more regular or recurring transactions could establish 
ordinary business activities under the statute and allow claims 
tenuously related to securities to survive a motion to dismiss. 
V.  REAFFIRMING SECTION 75-1.1’S BROAD REMEDIAL PURPOSE 
Straightforward remedies correcting the confusion and difficulty 
of the HAJMM standard do exist, and the time is ripe for either 
judicial or legislative reaffirmation of section 75-1.1 as a useful tool to 
combat unfairness and deception in business transactions. 
Narrowness is often a virtue in applying section 75-1.1’s extraordinary 
damages provision, but the categorical dismissals of otherwise viable 
claims following HAJMM highlight the gaps the decision created. 
This Part first explores possible legislative remedies. The discussion 
then addresses the possibility that the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina could overturn HAJMM by acknowledging the 
extraordinary event doctrine’s failure to address situations like Latigo 
or Tillery. 
A. Legislative Revision or Guidance 
The most expedient solution for section 75-1.1’s weakness in 
addressing regulation-related issues after HAJMM would be a 
legislative effort to expand section 75-1.1 as a backstop regulatory 
tool. The General Assembly has an interest in protecting businesses 
and consumers alike when regulatory structures do not address 
unfairness or deception in any business transaction. As discussed 
above, decisions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
restricting the scope of prior versions of section 75-1.1 prompted a 
legislative restructuring that provided the present statute’s broad 
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powers to combat unfairness and deception.122 The legislature’s 
previous reluctance to intervene may be related to HAJMM’s 
purported justification that section 75-1.1 ultimately means to protect 
the consumer, and one-off transactions between businesses do not 
sufficiently affect the consumer. However, instances like Latigo and 
Tillery show that reading section 75-1.1 so narrowly precludes 
protection that the statute originally meant to provide. It is no longer 
“a broad remedial statute.”123 
The General Assembly could reinvigorate section 75-1.1’s 
usefulness in one of two ways. First, the legislature could add a 
subsection to the statute that provides judicial discretion to allow a 
claim to survive as a matter of law unless the judge can identify 
another regulatory remedy, whether public or private, which more 
appropriately or effectively addresses the alleged misconduct. Second, 
language could be added to ensure section 75-1.1 claims reach the 
merits of alleged unfairness or deception unless the conduct clearly 
falls within a pervasive and intricate regulatory scheme. While judges 
certainly could work to identify an alternative scheme that may apply, 
the second proposal may clarify the statute’s application and allow 
both more effective litigation and claim resolution based on the 
merits of the case. 
The first option, expanding judicial discretion, would serve as the 
General Assembly’s endorsement of North Carolina’s Business Court 
judges to effectively handle and dispose of complex business litigation 
matters.124 The legislature could acknowledge that section 75-1.1 
claims provide particularly thorny issues by directing judges to 
dispose of cases at their discretion when those cases are better 
resolved elsewhere. Judges should have more discretion to deny 
motions to dismiss when section 75-1.1 protections could supplement 
questionably applicable regulations. However, expanding judicial 
discretion in cases that already involve various unclear definitions of 
 
 122. See Rebecca A. Fiss, A Bump in the Road of Consumer Protection: How Bumpers 
v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia Stripped Section 75-1.1 of Its Ability to Protect 
Borrowers, 92 N.C. L. REV. 2145, 2145–46 (2014) (discussing the North Carolina General 
Assembly’s amendment of “the statute to broadly include ‘all business practices, however 
denominated’”). 
 123. Latigo Invs. II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc., No. 06 CVS 18666, 2007 WL 
2570753, at *4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 22, 2007). 
 124. See Mack Sperling, About This Blog, BROOKS PIERCE: N.C. BUS. LITIG. REP., 
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unfairness may further the problems created by HAJMM rather than 
limit them.125 A more definitive stance on the role and scope of 
section 75-1.1 from the state legislature would enhance a judge’s 
ability to allow or dismiss claims. 
The second option essentially involves a legislative endorsement 
of the Skinner reasoning that pervasive and intricate regulation 
should preclude section 75-1.1 protection, while clarifying that the 
HAJMM expansion does not apply where conduct falls outside of 
another regulatory scheme. Critics of this approach may argue that 
expanding section 75-1.1 applicability back to Skinner would simply 
lead to more frivolous claims muddying Business Court dockets after 
motions to dismiss, but the statute’s effect of deterring unfairness and 
deception relies on the possibility that claims could reach trial. 
Exemptions like HAJMM mean claims with merit may not survive 
simply because they come too close to a poorly defined category and 
not because they fail to allege unfairness or deception. If section 75-
1.1 claims arguably related to an exempt category, like securities, 
survived dismissal unless a regulatory scheme clearly precluded them, 
defendants would need to identify the particular avenue that a 
plaintiff should pursue instead of a section 75-1.1 claim for general 
unfairness or deception. Such added clarity in the pleadings would 
allow judges to make more decisions on the merits rather than 
acknowledge that the claim falls under a large umbrella of an 
exemption like HAJMM, the bounds of which are unclear and 
difficult to justify. Clear statutory language designed to regulate all 
unfair or deceptive conduct—up to the pervasive and intricate 
regulations governing particular circumstances—would increase the 
number of section 75-1.1 claims judged on their merits and prevent 
the proliferation of judicially crafted exemptions that effectively bar 
paths to a remedy. 
B. Judicial Solutions 
Absent legislative action, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
could emulate the reasoning in Tillery and Latigo by extending 
section 75-1.1 protection into circumstances where regulations do not 
already occupy the field or provide more effective remedies. The 
court could take further guidance from the Fourth Circuit’s logic in 
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Champion Pro and hold that private remedies, like the NFLPA’s 
enforcement apparatus, suffice to preclude section 75-1.1 claims.126 A 
binding North Carolina decision to that effect would solidify section 
75-1.1 as a regulatory tool while also giving lower courts latitude to 
dismiss cases employing section 75-1.1 as a settlement multiplier in 
lieu of another more appropriate remedy. Most importantly, though, 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, now under Chief Justice 
Martin’s leadership, should revisit his skepticism towards an 
expansion of the Skinner doctrine of pervasive and intricate 
regulation to the extraordinary event exemption of HAJMM that 
casts an overbroad and undefined shadow over section 75-1.1 
jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial exemptions erode section 75-1.1’s effectiveness when 
lower courts apply the exemption categorically rather than in a 
discretionary manner. Section 75-1.1 serves to “create a new, private 
cause of action for aggrieved consumers since traditional common law 
remedies were often deficient.”127 The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina additionally notes “that the purposes of the statutory 
provisions for treble money damages, N.C.G.S. §	75-16, and 
attorneys’ fees, N.C.G.S. §	75-16.1, were to encourage private 
enforcement in the marketplace and to make the bringing of such a 
suit more economically feasible.”128 Since “unfairness and deception 
are gauged by consideration of the effect of the practice on the 
marketplace,”129 the state of the law after HAJMM leaves section 75-
1.1 inapplicable regardless of the availability of a remedy through 
other channels. A business engaged in a securities transaction of little 
or no interest to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
should still have an opportunity to recover under section 75-1.1 when 
unfairness or deception occurs.  
Moreover, fundraising activities are so vitally important to 
businesses that they may as well qualify as day-to-day even if they 
 
 126. See Champion Pro Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Impact Sports Football, LLC, 845 F.3d 
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occur infrequently. The HAJMM rule, which precludes claims arising 
out of unusual circumstances for the business, weakens the statute. 
Therefore, it is time for section 75-1.1 to regain its utility as “a broad 
remedial statute.”130 Transactions between businesses generally fall 
within the scope of section 75-1.1, meaning that a party to a 
transaction may invoke the statute’s protections against its 
counterpart in appropriate circumstances.131 Business transactions, 
though, may also be subject to considerable regulatory structures, 
such as securities laws. Where these regulatory structures cover the 
transaction and provide the plaintiff a remedy, applying section 75-1.1 
too broadly may only muddy the already murky waters of business 
regulation. Courts and practitioners must determine if regulatory 
structures essentially preempt section 75-1.1 claims by providing an 
alternative path to recovery, such as filing a complaint with the SEC 
rather than the North Carolina Business Court. When there is no 
clearly applicable road to recovery in tort or a regulatory structure, 
however, it would appear section 75-1.1 is uniquely positioned and 
arguably intended to fill a gap and provide a cause of action against 
unfairness or deception.132 These gaps highlight section 75-1.1’s utility 
as a regulatory gap-filler to combat unfairness and deception because 
section 75-1.1 is redundant if regulatory channels could provide a 
remedy.133 
North Carolina does not benefit from litigants asserting baseless 
claims that business ventures have been unfair or deceptive in dealing 
with each other, using section 75-1.1 and its damages multiplier to 
improperly influence their counterpart to settle. The state’s business 
community will operate most efficiently and effectively when 
businesspeople are confident that their counterparts will not 
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immediately sue them for unfair and deceptive conduct if a deal goes 
wrong. A negotiation conducted under the cloud of easily accessible 
windfalls through treble damages encourages transparency and 
fairness no more than it encourages unnecessary levels of due 
diligence and tentative forecasting about the future. Conversely, the 
availability of section 75-1.1 protection may function as a regulatory 
safety net in appropriate circumstances where no other regulations 
address bad conduct. A businessperson who has suffered from unfair 
or deceptive conduct, even during an extraordinary business activity 
like selling a company, should retain access to section 75-1.1 
remedies. In deciding whether a section 75-1.1 exemption applies, 
courts should only dismiss these claims as a matter of law when the 
conduct is addressed by another pervasive regulatory structure and a 
remedy under that structure is reasonably available. 
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